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Defiant Afterlife

Disability and Uniting Ourselves to God

Kevin Timpe

Historically, the treatment of people with disabilities by the Church has been mixed. Many Christians have evidenced a profound care of and concern for people with disabilities throughout much of the Church’s history; and there are certainly pockets of its history wherein aspects of the Church have evidenced not just personal but communal care and inclusion of those with disabilities. However, as with other kinds of social exclusions and problematic treatment of subpopulations (e.g., racism and sexism), large parts of the Church’s history with respect to individuals with disabilities call for lament and repentance rather than celebration.

In particular, many Christian theologians have struggled with how people with disabilities could be perfectly united to God in the afterlife. For some, disabilities are assimilated into the category of disease. Given the idea that there can be no suffering or disease in heaven, this leads to the idea that union with God requires that those with disabilities have their disabilities removed prior to heavenly union with God. Others have suggested that certain profound disabilities preclude an individual’s ability to have such union, thus suggesting that such individuals have no eschatological place in the Body of Christ. In the present paper, I develop and consider an argument for the possibility of individuals retaining their disabilities in the eschaton and nevertheless enjoying complete union with God (and through God to others). I don’t think that the argument I develop is decisive, as it requires a number of controversial claims that I here cannot adequately argue for in the present paper. Nor is this argument intended to necessarily apply equally well to all disabilities, in part because, as I suggest in section 3 below, I don’t think that the term ‘disability’ refers to exactly the same thing in all contexts, neatly demarcating those individuals who do have disabilities from those who don’t. Nevertheless, I think that the argument developed here gives us reason to be open to the possibility of heavenly disability as a plausible part of speculative theology.

The present paper proceeds as follows. In section 1 I briefly survey some of the problematic history of with respect to Christian theological reflection on disability, drawing out objectionable assumptions about the value of individuals with disabilities, assumptions that have eschatological implications for those individuals. In section 2, I consider a number of recent treatments of the relationship between disability and eschatology by Terrence Ehrman, Amos Yong, R. T. Mullins, and Richard Cross. Finally, in section 3 I argue for the conclusion that at least some disabilities can be retained in the afterlife in a way that doesn’t detract from the beatific vision of the redeemed. This argument will depend on a number of controversial assumptions about both disabilities and ancillary principles. Nevertheless, I think these assumptions are defensible, even if I can’t undertake their defence here. I then conclude that to the degree that we find these assumptions plausible, we have reason to consider heavenly disability as part of a plausible speculative theology.

A brief word on the paper’s title. ‘Defiant Afterlife’ is a riff on Defiant Birth, the title of a collection of stories from women who avoided the cultural pressure to abort their children with disabilities. Melinda Tankard Reist, the volume’s editor, describes the collection this way:

Defiant Birth is a book about women who have resisted the present day practice of medical eugenics. It is about women who were told they should not have babies because of perceived disabilities… They have confronted a society deeply fearful of disability and all its stigma. Facing silent disapproval and even open hostility, they have had their babies anyway, believing their children are just as worthy to partake of life as are others. This is a book about women who have resisted the ideology of quality control and the paradigm of perfection. They have dared to challenge the prevailing medical and social mindset. This book’s contributors have refused to take part in a system of disability deselection.2

Just as that collection seeks to defiantly resist the claim that some humans shouldn’t be born because of their disabilities, the present paper seeks to resist the claim that having a disability is sufficient to preclude complete union with God in the afterlife.3 It seeks to push back against those strands of thought, often found within the Church, that individuals with various disabilities either cannot achieve union with God or can do so only after their disabilities are ‘cured’ or ‘healed’. That is, I argue that an individual’s having a disability does not necessarily

1 Below in section 3, I indicate that I think there is no single concept which rightly captures the nature of a disability. It should not be surprising, then, that I cannot define what I mean by ‘disability’ here at the beginning of the paper.


3 It has been suggested to me that the connection here to Defiant Birth, and abortion in particular, would turn off some readers. In the context of the present paper the connection to eugenic practice of selection abortion on the basis of disability is a connection I prefer to embrace rather than distance myself from.
preclude them from being full members of the heavenly banquet, and that God’s consummate feast need not involve disability deselection.

However, even if the present argument is successful, it neither shows that all disabilities are compatible with perfect union with God in the afterlife nor that there are no disabilities that will be cured. Given that I think there is no single thing that is disability, this limitation should not be surprising. If there is no single thing that is disability, we should expect that different disabilities might relate to union with God in different ways.

1. Historical Views on the Exclusion of Disability from the Afterlife

This section gives a quick overview of some of the Christian tradition’s problematic history with respect to disability. In particular, I aim to highlight theological claims which suggest that disabilities must be healed for individuals to experience perfect union with God in heaven.

1.1 Disability in Scripture

Consider first the Christian canon. Even though it’s not a central theme, many of the Christian Scriptures contain a close connection between disability, on the one hand, and sin, impurity, or disobedience on the other. Disability, like ‘disease’, is often used to mark off individuals as ‘impure’. What it means to be whole or lacking faithfulness. Zechariah’s doubts about Gabriel’s promise of a child result in the angel disabling Zechariah by striking him mute. Spiritual failure and deceit are regularly associated with blindness, as is mental illness with demonic possession. Individuals were sometimes imprisoned, tortured, or even executed as a result. Even if they were tolerated within a community, individuals with disabilities were seen as ‘lesser’ and often treated improperly.

This isn’t to say that negative attitudes were ubiquitous. While many disabilities were seen as caused by sin, not all were. Reflecting on the medieval period, H. C. Erik Midelfort writes that ‘medieval and early modern thinkers regularly distinguished mental disorders [and disabilities] of organic origin from those based on moral, spiritual, or demonic influence.’ Furthermore, during this same period, Christian monasteries and nunneries across Europe ran hospices for the disabled and mentally ill, finding ways for them to be productive members of their local communities (even if the conditions those individuals often lived and were cared for in would strike us as problematic). Despite the positive instances of care, the Church has failed to love, value, and care for individuals as it ought because of the presence of disabilities.

...
1.2 Luther

I turn now to a brief discussion of two theologians whose writings on disability reflect the problematic assumptions and associations represented in the previous section. A difficulty encountered here is that these theologians didn't address disability systematically; what they thought often has to be gleaned from passing comments or treatments focused on other topics. Furthermore, these two examples aren't intended to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, these two examples should give sufficient context for thinking that there is a robust history of problematic theological reflection on disability.

The Reformer Martin Luther stands as a notable theologian whose views about disability are ableist. Here I have in mind especially his claim in the Tischreden (usually translated as Table Talk) where Luther suggests that a twelve-year-old boy from Dessau, who scholars think likely suffered from Prader-Willi Syndrome, ought to be drowned. Interpreting the relevant passage is difficult, in part because there are three different versions of the Tischreden and it records notes of a conversation with Luther over dinner, rather than being written by Luther himself. However, all three versions contain the claim that 'monstrosities' are not human but merely animal. One version of the Tischreden suggests that Luther endorsed the view that rather than being human, the child was an offspring of the devil—i.e., a 'changeling.' In what Stefan Heuser refers to as 'the most trustworthy' of the three versions of Table Talk, Luther writes:

I simply think he's a mass of flesh without a soul. Couldn't the devil have done this, inasmuch as he gives such shape to the body and the mind even of those who have reason that in their obsession they hear, see, and feel nothing?

In another version of the same incident, Luther apparently denies that the boy should be baptized because he's 'only animal life.'

Some scholars take this to indicate that Luther, like others in the Christian tradition, have equated disability with demon possession or connection with Satan, literally demonizing some people with disabilities. Many in the disability rights community have latched onto this issue in particular as evidence for just how deep ableist assumptions and stereotypes are in the Christian tradition. Stefan Heuser writes that 'Luther's suggestion that the disabled boy be killed appears symptomatic not only of a medieval superstition but of beliefs that are very much alive in contemporary responses to disability.... Such a conclusion [regarding the boy] is paradigmatic of any discourse that rests on the separation of "the disabled" from "the normal".'

Other scholars push back on the connection here. C. F. Goodey and Tim Stainton argue that Luther's comment has been grossly overinterpreted. And even Heuser himself admits that 'Luther's comments on changelings operate within a discourse seeking to distinguish between human beings and devil's children, not between "normal" and "disabled" human beings... as in the modern disability discourse.'

It must also be admitted that there are conflicting strands within Luther's thought on disability. Elsewhere he's clear that other kinds of disabling conditions are a natural part of human earthly life, writing that 'even if one member of the body has a defect, the entire person, still endowed with body and soul, shows forth nothing but God's goodness.' He also explicitly states that 'the deaf and the dumb [so long as they are rational]... deserve the same things that we do' and thus should be given the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist. He holds that deaf or blind individuals should be allowed to marry and that they may have more faith than many able-bodied individuals. And there is historical reason to think that Luther had a long-term personal relationship with an individual with a disability who served as his personal assistant for over twenty-five years.

So the kind of sentiment that the Tischreden evidences isn't a main thrust of Luther's moral theology. While this may be the case, that doesn't mean that Luther's reaction, if accurately recorded in this text, is innocuous. In fact, even if Luther thought that the child wasn't a changeling but merely a non-human animal, this still indicates a dehumanization and devaluing that we ought to object to. Luther's insistence elsewhere in his theology that the devil is one of 'God's [providential] decree and punishment' further problematizes the connection here. And Luther's thoughts on the boy from Dessau aren't the only problematic ideas about disability that Luther had. He suggests a number of
times, for instance, that pregnant women can cause their children to be born with disabilities or deformities by becoming too scared.  

1.3 Calvin

The Reformer John Calvin is another influential theologian who problematically understands disability within his theology. Given Calvin’s approach to biblical theology, he accepts—apparently consistently and uncritically—the connection between sin and disability mentioned earlier. And there are further problems as well.

We shouldn’t be surprised that Calvin doesn’t provide a specific theological discussion of disability and the eschaton given his general opposition to theological speculation, which he rejected in favour of biblical theology. He explicitly warns of the dangers of speculative theology regarding matters eschatological in the Institutes:

Here, indeed, if anywhere in the secret mysteries of scripture, we ought to play the philosopher soberly and with great moderation; let us use great caution that neither our thoughts nor our speech go beyond the limits to which the Word of God itself extends.

And elsewhere:

We also feel how we are titillated by an immoderate desire to know more than is lawful. From this, trifling and harmful questions repeatedly flow forth—trifling, I say, for from them no profit can be derived. But this second kind is worse because those who indulge in them entangle themselves in dangerous speculations; accordingly, I call these questions ‘harmful.’

In fact, Calvin specifically mentions the nature of the resurrected body as one of the theological topics about which we ought not speculate even though he was clear that the resurrection requires numerical identity between the present and resurrected bodies.

A particularly problematic part of Calvin’s theology with respect to disability is his view that the sacrament of the Eucharist ought to be restricted to those who were sufficiently ‘well enough instructed’ and could recite the catechism, thereby excluding individuals with intellectual disabilities. For Calvin, one of the defining characteristics of human nature is rationality; it’s largely human rationality that distinguishes us from mere beasts and is part of what the imago dei consists in. Calvin is clear that all, especially fallen, humans have intellectual and cognitive limitations, limitations which are furthered impaired by the noetic effects of sin. However,

he [Calvin] fails to reflect on the genuine diversity of human intellect, seeming instead to assume that we all share similar degrees of pride, vanity, and cognitive capacity. This is an example of a recurring and problematic theme throughout Calvin’s work, where he simultaneously appears to value and equalize all people (we have all fallen and yet all have sacred worth) and yet (intentionally or not) does not truly include all people in this vision, particularly those who differ from his expectation of normal rationality or intellectual capacity.

The fact that individuals with intellectual impairment ought to be denied the Eucharist is especially problematic given Calvin’s view of the centrality of that sacrament to the Christian life. For Calvin, the Christian life (whether individual or communal) ‘cannot be said to be well ordered and regulated unless in it the Holy Supper of our Lord is always being celebrated and frequented’. The Eucharist is a way—perhaps even the paradigmatic way—of binding us to Christ and, through Him, to other members of the Church in ecclesial unity. According to J. Todd Billings, Calvin’s ‘strongest of language of participation of humanity in the goodness of God’ relates to the sacraments. Through the sacraments believers truly participate in Christ; they do not simply imitate Christ or partake of his benefits. And Calvin speaks of the grace that is imparted in the sacrament of the Eucharist as ‘knowledge’. In this context, theologian John Hull worries that the required participation in the Eucharist and the high demand on the clergy by the Ministers at the Council, January 16, 1537, in Institutiones, vol 7.

34 Whether those who are unable to speak should also be denied the Eucharist is unclear. It’s plausible, however, that Calvin, like others in the sixteenth century, would have interpreted individuals unable to speak as having cognitive impairment, even if they had none. Given his endorsement of infant baptism, Calvin likely would have been fine with baptizing those individuals, whether infant or not, who had cognitive impairments. The bias against intellectual disability is often more theologically intractable than bias against physical disability; see Haslam 2013.

35 It’s not clear to me that Calvin would explicitly say that individuals with severe cognitive disabilities fail to be human or fail to be created in the imago dei. One option, which one finds in Aquinas, is to say that all humans have the requisite reasoning abilities, but those with disabilities are prevented from exercising them by some bodily condition. See Cross 2012.

36 See Institutes 1.233 and 1.234.

37 Creamer 2012: 221.

38 Calvin, ‘Articles concerning the Organization of the Church and of Worship at Geneva proposed by the Ministers at the Council, January 16, 1537’, in Calvin: Theological Treatises, 48.


40 Billings 2005, 323f. As Eiesland writes, Eucharistic practice ‘that excludes or segregates people with disabilities is not a celebration of the real body of Christ’ (Eiesland 1994: 114).

41 See Gerrish 1993: 118f.
human rationality that it requires suggests an ableist limitation on participation in the life of Christ: 'It has often been thought that the image of God is to be found in human reason, but this is not acceptable to a disability theology since people with severe intellectual disabilities would be excluded from being in the divine image.'

Furthermore, if the kind of union required for the beatific vision comes through the Eucharist, then Calvin may have thought that those with such disabilities are not capable of such union. Since, on his view, the Eucharist is a gift, it looks like it's a gift not given to those with disabilities.

These two parts of Calvin's theology suggests that he valued at least some intellectually disabled humans less than non-disabled humans. Though he has medieval theologians in mind here and not Calvin, Richard Cross's claim that those views which 'seem' to put those who lack reason in the place of second-class citizens in the community of the church appears to apply to Calvin's view as well.

1.4 Historical Implications

While the above discussion has been cursory, both in terms of its examination of Scripture and engaging the breadth of historical theology, the problematic nature of at least some Christian theology regarding disability should be sufficiently clear. Summarizing the biblical witness, Jamie Clark-Soles writes that 'linking sin with impairment can be a dangerous, destructive habit. A connection may be possible in particular cases, but such is not inevitable. Similarly, tying salvation and forgiveness of sins to a “cure” is also problematic.' It is this connection which has lead so much of the Christian tradition to believe that those with disabilities need to be healed to enjoy perfect union with God in the afterlife. Theologian Amos Yong, who's written extensively on how disability ought to shape our forgiveness of sins to a "cure" is also problematic.

I think that the Church can, and should, do better.

2. Contemporary Arguments

While much Christian reflection on disability reflects these problematic assumptions, a number of contemporary theologians and philosophers have recently explored other options on the nature of disability and its relationship to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. This section does not seek to be exhaustive, but rather aims to show the range of views. In the final section of the paper, I develop an argument for the existence of at least some disabilities in the eschaton, offered as a mediating position between those I canvas here.

2.1 Ehrman

I begin with a recent argument by Terrence Ehrman for the claim that disabilities may be healed eschatologically. Given its own assumptions, I think the argument is largely successful: Ehrman shows how it can be that some disabilities are healed in the resurrection. But as I'll argue, it's one thing to argue that disabilities can be healed eschatologically and quite another to argue that disabilities will be healed eschatologically. It's an even further claim to argue that a disability must be healed eschatologically for there to be perfect union with God. And even if that could be established, it's yet an even stronger claim that all disabilities must be healed eschatologically. I think that Ehrman fails to establish the claim that

Similarly, in her influential book The Disabled God, Nancy Eiesland claims that this history shapes how individuals with disabilities continue to be excluded by the Christian community:

Three themes—sin and disability conflation, virtuous suffering, and segregationist charity—illustrate the theological obstacles encountered by people with disabilities who seek inclusion and justice within the Christian community. It cannot be denied that the biblical record and Christian theology have often been dangerous for persons with disabilities.

I think that the Church can, and should, do better.

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42 Hull 2014: 82. 43 Gerrish 1993: 135–8. 44 Cross 2012: 427. 45 Clark-Soles 2017: 344. 46 Yong 2011: 118ff. 47 Eiesland 1994: 74. 48 Ehrman clearly offers this argument as tentative, not settled: 'theological humility should characterized discussion about the resurrection' for since such speculative theology involves "learned ignorance" (Ehrman 2015: 733). I grant him the need for theological humility, but I don't think the need for such humility rules out an appropriate role for speculative theology. For instance, in Timpe 2015 I argue that a particular account of limbo is worth considering as part of speculative theology, motivated in part by considerations related to disability.
disability must be healed eschatologically, and thus falls also with regard to the strongest of these claims that all disabilities must be healed eschatologically. Given this, and given the kind of ableist devaluing of individuals with disabilities that mark earlier views that seem to share Ehrman’s conclusion, we have a motivation to explore arguments for the possibility of individuals retaining their disabilities in the eschaton.

Ehrman claims to show ‘that Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology provides the best context to understand the human person such that disability is not essential to identity’. But if this is what he aims to show, his argument fails. Ehrman thinks that Thomistic hylomorphic anthropology is better than a number of emergentism materialistic views of human nature. But I don’t think he successfully shows hylomorphic dualism with regard to human nature to be better than these other views, in part because proponents of these views have responses to his criticisms that he doesn’t consider. Furthermore, there are competitor views that he doesn’t engage at all. So, as an attempt to show his preferred anthropology is best, his efforts come up short. Fortunately, for present purposes we can sidestep this part of his article, since I don’t think any of what will follow about disability in the eschaton depends on settling the question of human nature.

For Ehrman, the Christian doctrines of resurrection and the subsequent union with God in beatitude require numerical identity between the resurrected person and the earthly person with disabilities. I agree. But so far as I can tell, no one in the relevant literature disputes this. Rather, the question is about the relationship between an individual’s disability and numerical identity. Ehrman is arguing against a number of theologians of disability who suggest that disability is part of an individual’s identity. It’s sometimes not clear how to take these theological claims, in part because some theologians don’t clearly differentiate between numerical and the relevant sort of qualitative identity. Ehrman takes them to be making a claim about numerical identity:

The authors presume disability is integral to identity because it is divinely bestowed. A person with a disability cannot be the same person, and thus numerically identity [sic] is absent, ‘if the primary theological story we tell about him requires that he be changed into something different when he dies….’ Healing of a disability for these authors eliminates identity.

Ehrman thinks that the requirement for numerical identity in the resurrection doesn’t require qualitative identity: ‘The numerically identical person who lived and died is also raised by God’s power and love. This does not entail that qualitative identity remains the same…. Could we not imagine the divine resurrected healing of a sibling with Down syndrome that does not destroy her identity?’ Whether we can imagine such a situation depends on the relationship between imaginability (or conceivability) and possibility, whether such a healing is in fact possible, and the robustness of our imaginations when it comes to disability. That a person with Down syndrome is ‘cured’ of this condition in the afterlife is assumed rather than established by Ehrman’s rhetorical question.

Earlier in the article, Ehrman claims that because disability is merely permitted by God and not caused by Him directly, a disability is an accidental feature of the individual who has it. And as an accidental feature, it doesn’t impact the person’s humanity or value. Given that healings from some disabilities happen in the present life without undermining personal identity, I take Scripture to establish that sometimes disability can be healed. Here, I agree with Ehrman: ‘Divine healing on earth does not eliminate identity, and numerical identity is not challenged by divine healing in the resurrection. But the question now centers on whether healing of impairments and disabilities will take place in the resurrection.’ More specifically, the question now centres on whether heavenly ‘cure’ or ‘healing’ should be hoped for in all cases. And here Ehrman’s argument is lacking.

Granting Ehrman all his (broadly Thomistic) assumptions for present purposes, he may have shown how disabilities can be healed in the resurrection prior to the eschaton ‘because they are not inherent to our identity’. But to show that the eschaton can involve the actualization of a certain possibility doesn’t establish that it must for the beatific vision to be achieved. It’s possible that I’ll have long flowing locks in the eschaton and that my face will shine with the glory of a Tim Pawl-esque beard. But of course it doesn’t follow from this possibility that I will

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54 Ehrman 2015: 725; quoting Swinton, Mowat, and Baines 2011: 9. Ehrman makes the same claim about Nancy Eiesland’s statement: ‘having been disabled from birth, I came to believe that in heaven I would be absolutely unknown to myself and perhaps to God’ (Eiesland 1994: 2). But notice that that quotation says nothing about numerical identity.

55 Ehrman 2015: 734.

56 ‘Those who have physical and/or mental impairments and disabilities are no less human persons, rather the impairments and disabilities are frustrated capacities and not indicative of a qualitatively different nature’ (Ehrman 2015: 732).

57 Ehrman 2015: 736. For a related discussion, see Hull 2014: 87ff.

58 Concerns over ‘curing’ disability, particularly autism, given the impact on a person’s identity can also be found in non-theology writing as well; see for instance Anderson 2013.

59 Ehrman 2015: 737.
have such follicled glory, much less that I must have such for beatitude and perfect union with God.  

2.2 Yong and Mullins

A recent exchange between Amos Yong and R.T. Mullins picks up on the issue of identity and disability in the eschaton. At the heart of their at times acerbic exchange is what Mullins refers to as 'Stanley Hauerwas’s dictum': ‘To eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject.’ Mullins notes that Hauerwas himself doesn’t argue for this claim, but ‘simply asserts this, without justification, as a passing comment. In plays no role in the argument of his paper.’ If this dictum is correct, then union with God in the afterlife would require that disabilities remain, given that it will be the very same person who has a disability in this life that is united with God in the next. Mullins raises a number of problematic consequences from accepting Hauerwas’s dictum. Most importantly for present purposes, Mullins thinks that Yong ought to reject the claim that “disabilities must be retained in the resurrection in order to preserve identity and continuity.”

According to Mullins, Yong has a case of mistaken identity. By this I mean that he has confused metaphysical identity with a sense of self. Further, he has confused the “is” of predication with the “is of identity.” Mullins thinks that a person having a particular disability is a contingent state of affairs, and thus any disability is merely an accidental property rather than an essential property. Some surely are. But it’s odd to claim that Yong holds all disabilities are part of one’s personal identity, given that Yong is clear about the existence of acquired disabilities (for example, losing a leg in war), as well as the possibility that some disabilities are healed.

In a reply to Mullins’ criticism, Yong claims that Mullins’ article is ‘misleading’ on a number of points regarding Yong’s view, including taking Yong’s view to require commitment to Hauerwas’s dictum as a necessary truth. Consider Yong’s 2009 article that Mullins is primarily responding to:

The answer [regarding disability and the problem of evil] cannot be simply saying that God will in the end ‘heal’ such individuals of their genetic variation, as it is difficult to imagine how someone with trisomy-21 (for example) can be the same person without that chromosomal configuration. In these cases, for God not to allow the trisomic mutation may be for God not to allow the appearance of precisely that person. There may be no way, in this case, to eradicate the disability without eliminating the person.

Here, Yong is talking about the healing of disabilities in the eschaton. But notice the tentativeness of his discussion. Yong is making claims about what may be the case. In this article, Yong doesn’t argue for the truth of Hauerwas’s dictum. He just highlights dangers of taking all instances of disability to involve healing, dangers related to the discussion in section 1 above. ‘If we think that the afterlife is a “magical” fix to all the challenges imposed by disability, then we may be more inclined to simply encourage people with disabilities (as has long been done) to bear up under their lot and await God’s eschatological healing for their lives.’

Even in his earlier book on the subject, Theology and Down Syndrome, Yong doesn’t argue for the claim that disability is always integral to personal identity in the way suggested by Hauerwas’s dictum. Rather, he seeks to take the testimony of those who say it is seriously, and see if it can be accommodated. ‘My point is simply to show that disability perspectives raise probing questions about traditional eschatological articulations concerning the heavenly hope and the resurrection of the body If they are to survive the interrogations informed by the experience of disability, our eschatological and theological visions may need reformulated.’

Continuing along these lines:

I further speculate that people with intellectual or developmental disabilities, such as, those with Down Syndrome or trisomic chromosome 21—will also retain their phenotypical features in their resurrection bodies. There will be sufficient continuity to ensure recognizability as well as self-identity.

The first claim here is primarily about the phenotypical features of bodies and their role in the beatific vision. And the second claim is about self-understanding
or self-identity. Yong continues that for all persons, not just those with disabilities, so also will the resurrected body be the site through which the meaning of our narratives are transformed (and thus eternally).\textsuperscript{72}

So it's just not the case that Yong is committed to the truth of Hauerwas's dictum in the way that Mullins suggests.\textsuperscript{73} If he's not committed to its truth, then it follows that he's not committed to it being necessarily true. I agree that there is reason to think that Hauerwas's dictum is false, since it can't be true if there is any person such that they have a disability at one time and lack that disability at another. As already indicated, there are such people, namely those with acquired or temporary disabilities. Furthermore, what's important for this paper's purpose is that rejecting Hauerwas's dictum doesn't entail that there won't be any disabilities in heaven.

If having a particular disability is an accidental rather than essential property of the person who has that disability, then it is possible that the person be resurrected without having that property and yet not have their personal identity endangered. Mullins is right about this conditional. But note that not all accidental properties must be lost in the resurrection. For instance, consider the following properties: the property of being a parent or the property of being the co-author that Tim Pawl attributes his errors to.\textsuperscript{74} I have both of these properties. But nothing in the resurrection requires that I cease to be my children's parent or the locus of Pawl's diverting blame simply because those properties aren't essential to my personal identity. We strongly identify with lots of our non-essential properties; but our resurrection doesn't require that they're not present in the eschaton.

2.3 Cross

Whereas Ehrman tries to argue that there will be no disabilities in heaven because they will all be cured, Richard Cross explores the possibility that part of what it means to be human is to be disabled. Much of Cross's discussion focuses on

\textsuperscript{72} Yong 2007: 283. Yong cites positively Jerry Walls's claim that resurrected bodies will be 'healed', even of disability. Here is Walls: "Given that heaven is a place of perfect wholeness and happiness, it is surely reasonable to believe that defects of mind and body will be repaired. Physical deformities, diseases, maiming, crippling, mental deficiencies, and the like obviously represent obstacles to human satisfaction in the fullest sense of the word....This is not to deny that such defects will continue as a part of human identity in heaven. Those who negotiated this life with the additional struggles of mental or physical deformities will retain the memories of doing so as well as the positive character traits they formed as a result." (Walls 2002: 112) Note that what Walls is here claiming, and what Yong indicates agreement with, is the following: (a) that the resurrection body will be numerically identical with the present body; (b) that the memories, experiences, and character traits that shape an individual's self-understanding will be retained; and (c) that at least some disabilities will be healed. And Yong claims that Walls is correct about (c).

\textsuperscript{73} Mullins admits that there is an ambiguity in Yong's work his endorsement of Hauerwas's dictum: Mullins 2011: 26, fn. 9.

\textsuperscript{74} Pawl 2019: vili.

medieval accounts of the Incarnation (particularly those by Thomas Aquinas, Hervaeus Natalis, and John Duns Scotus), according to which the second person of the Trinity assumes a full human nature. This one person is both fully divine and fully human. Many of the details, especially the historical interpretive details, of Cross's argument can be set aside for present purposes.

Drawing on Scotus, Cross suggests that the instrumentality relation can sometimes provide for a union between a person and an instrument, such as a prosthetic limb:

I shall assume that this kind of unity—satisfied merely by relations of efficient causation—obtains between a person and an external tool or (in effect) a prosthetic limb. But I shall assume too that this unity is just as strong as obtains between a substance and an intrinsic part (e.g. a limb united to its whole by some kind of relation of formal causality). The only significant different is that external tools and prostheses are in principle easier to detach and attach than intrinsic parts are (compare a knife with an arm-blade).\textsuperscript{75}

If this kind of unity is possible, then Cross suggests that in the Incarnation the assumed human nature becomes a 'total prosthesis'\textsuperscript{76} of the Incarnate second person of the Trinity, where a total prosthesis performs 'all human vital functions for a person, and [is] the instrument of that person in all human causal activity in the world'.\textsuperscript{77}

While the Incarnational theology here is provocative, that's not the aspect of Cross's view that is relevant for present purposes. Rather, what I want to focus on here is if Cross's suggestion for understanding the Incarnation is correct, what follows for how we might understand disability in the eschaton. For Cross, the implications here aren't hard to see:

On this view, the model or archetype of human personhood is something that is dependent in various ways on some kind of prosthesis.... Given that the Incarnate divine person is the normative case of what it is to be a human person, the incarnation shows that persons, normatively, are substances that include and depend on prostheses. Putting it another way, we might say that, normatively, human persons are intrinsically disabled or impaired.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} Cross 2011: 645.  
\textsuperscript{76} Cross 2011: 646.  
\textsuperscript{77} Cross 2011: 650.  
\textsuperscript{78} Cross 2011: 647f. In personal correspondence, Cross admits that 'prosthesis-dependence comes in degrees, [but] given both (a) that it is hard to imagine a greater degree of it than Christ has, and (b) that such dependence is something available to all humans too, Christ's prosthetic nature looks like a good candidate for something paradigmatic for humanity—an ideal case that we cannot attain but that tells us something about what it is to be human.' There are other properties that the Incarnate Christ has that are not normative in the same way: 'Being Jewish, being born of Mary, and (for that matter) being male do not fit that bill, since necessarily some people lack those features.' It may also be, as Mike Rea has suggested, that not all prostheses function in the same way. Rea gives the example of soldiers who
In a footnote later in the paper, Cross clarifies:

I distinguish impairment and disability below.... As I make clear there, in line with suggestions made in my introduction, above, impairment is dependence; disability is the failure of the environment—be it the physical environment or the activities of other human agents—to provide the conditions for provide [sic] for opportunities for dependence necessary for flourishing. So, strictly speaking, human persons are intrinsically impaired, but not disabled.79

What I refer to in this paper with the term 'disability' aligns, at least in many cases, more closely with Cross's use of 'imperfection' than with what he refers to as 'disability'. It will be important to keep the terminology straight. Here, Cross suggests that given that the assumption of a 'human nature prosthesis' by the second person of the Trinity in the Incarnation gives us reason to think that all humans are intrinsically impaired, it follows from the goodness of God that impairment (again on Cross's use of that term) is a good thing, thus undercutting the kinds of negative assessments we saw above in section 1. More specifically, the goodness here is related to our mutual interdependence and the kind of community intended for humans.80

Whether or not this view of view of human nature and its relationship to impairment ultimately holds up will depend on other philosophical commitments regarding human nature, substantial unity, etc. I won't take a stand on these issues here, primarily because I don't need to. Cross's view needs further development if it's to give us an account of what properties are normative for human nature and which ones aren't. But suppose that he's able to do this. That is, suppose, as Cross argues, that part of what it means to be human is to be impaired. If that were the case, then insofar as we remain humans in our eschatological union with God in the afterlife, we'll be impaired there. We'd then have an account of beatified impairment. It's just that heaven will be such that it will 'provide an environment suitable for people with impairments to satisfy their needs or achieve their goals'.81

might depend on night-vision goggles or combat exoskeletons; but the need for these prostheses to perform some functions doesn't seem to entail that the soldiers are intrinsically disabled. Neil Harbison, an artist who was born completely blind, designed a wearable camera that translates colour frequencies into sound, allowing him to 'hear colour'. One version of this device allows him to hear ultraviolet light, not just the usual visual spectrum. Even though a non-colour-blind individual could also use this device, it's not obvious that that possibility means that all humans are intrinsically impaired in Cross's sense of the term. Furthermore, Cross is trying to give an account of human nature, not an account of how to move 'beyond' human nature. For more on disability and transhumanism, see Hall 2016.

79 Cross 2011: 657, n. 28; see also 650.
80 See Cross 2011: 653 and 648, where he explicitly connects his view with Alasdair MacIntyre's work on human dependence.
81 Cross 2011: 650f.
and 'mere-difference' views of disability as follows. Those views which hold that 'disability is by itself something that makes you worse off [are] "bad-difference" views of disability"86 while mere-difference views are those according to which having a disability doesn’t by itself or automatically make you worse off. This way of drawing the contrast, she notes, is 'rough-and-ready',87 but it should be sufficient for present purposes. Furthermore, the connection between the disability and the difference in well-being is important for differentiating bad-difference from mere-difference disabilities. It is consistent with a rejection of a bad-difference view that individuals with disabilities are in fact worse off than non-disabled individuals, insofar as that difference is caused by social structures or ableism (where ableism is understood as the systemic and structural undervaluing of disabled lives, analogous to other forms of systemic bias such as racism, sexism, or classism).88 There might also be bad effects of disabilities that would still exist in the absence of ableism. But those same disabilities might allow for other goods that are perhaps unique to or even just more common for those with the disability. So the question is whether the effects caused by disability are net-negative in that they are 'counterfactually stable'; that is, 'would [they] have such effect even in the absence of ableism'?89

Barnes doesn’t think that any physical disabilities are bad-difference disabilities, though her book leaves it open that perhaps other kinds of disabilities are.90 But suppose for the moment that there are some disabilities that involve bad-difference. Suppose, that is, that there are disabilities that involve bad-difference such that those who have them are objectively worse off in some way that isn’t just caused by ableism or problematic social structures.91

Heaven is essentially a place of ultimate happiness, and no state is a state of ultimate happiness if one could be in a different state and be happier. Now, consider two individuals plausibly in the beatific vision. One experiences the joys of heaven and their well-being is decreased due to the presence of a bad-difference disability. The other individual experiences those same joys as the first but does not have a disability that intrinsically involves a decrease to their well-being. If we ask ourselves which of these two individuals is happier, I think it’s clear that (all else being equal) the latter life involves more happiness since it involves more well-being. So if heaven is to be the state of human existence than which none better can be conceived, I don’t see how it can involve the presence of anything which causes a decrease to our well-being.92 So if heaven were to involve bad-difference disabilities then it wouldn’t be a place of ultimate happiness, and hence wouldn’t be worthy of the name.93

Or consider the possibility of disabilities that intrinsically prevent a person’s ability to worship God, or to engage in such action collectively with the other saints. If there were to be disabilities that inhibited human–divine union in this way, given the kind of perfect uniting with God that marks the beatific vision, those disabilities may no longer be present. Any state of affairs that prevents perfect union with or worship of God will be absent. But the possibility that some disabilities might have such an effect certainly doesn’t entail that all disabilities are like that, and I think we have reasons (both testimonial and theological) to believe that not all disabilities would have this negative effect.

So there may be some disabilities that are healed in the eschaton. But note that the reasoning here is not just because a disability is present, but rather because the disability prevents perfection of the union with God characteristic of the beatific vision. For any disability that does not involve bad-difference or which does not intrinsically interfere with union with and worship of God, then the reason why it must not be present in heaven is absent.94 As mentioned above, there are many accidental features of our identities that will still be present in the eschaton. And so unless a disability needs to be removed for perfect union with God (and through God with others), then perhaps we should admit it into our heavenly vision. Are there disabilities whose presence doesn’t interfere with such union?

I believe that there are. Consider, for instance, blindness. Certainly blindness can cause, and has caused, harms to individuals; that is, it has decreased their well-being. But the burden is on anyone who thinks that that decrease in well-being is primarily about one’s union with God to explain why vision is needed for union with God. Are all blind individuals objectively worse off in terms of their union with God in this life because of intrinsic features of the lack of vision? Certainly, individuals with vision impairments encounter harm from non-accessible physical environments. And much harm also comes from non-accessible social environments. But surely the Christian hope for the new heaven and the new earth could be made accessible. Since all the heavenly residents will also be perfected, there’s no reason to think this aspect of vision loss will defer one’s heavenly joy.

But what, one might ask, about the inherent goods of visual enjoyment? Wouldn’t one’s heavenly enjoyment be decreased by lack of visual goods, such as being able to enjoy heavenly visual arts that will surpass the glory of even the finest work by Bernini, Rubens, Caravaggio, Grunewald, Fra Angelico, Gaudi, and Terrence Malick. And wouldn’t one’s heavenly enjoyment also be decreased by

86 Barnes 2016: 55.
87 Barnes 2016: 55.
88 For useful discussions of ableism, see Scuro 2018 and Nario-Redmond 2019.
89 Barnes 2016: 60.
90 See Barnes 2016: 2ff; see also Campbell and Stramondo 2017: 163.
91 Campbell and Stramondo suggest that Tay-Sachs might be an instance of a bad-difference disability; see Campbell and Stramondo 2017: 165.
92 Note that this claim rules out all sorts of states of affairs, and not just the presence of bad-difference disabilities.
93 The argument in this paragraph is parallel to an argument in Pawl and Timpe 2009: 401.
94 If there are disabilities that need to be removed, then there’s a question about how they would be removed. I take no stand on that issue here.
not being able to gaze upon the marred, resurrected, and glorified Body of the Incarnate Christ?

As tempting as those questions might be, I think they’re mistaken. First, we need to take seriously the testimony offered by those with vision impairments. In addition to the general testimony by individuals with disabilities that suggests that disability doesn’t impact well-being as much as we might think, there is also literature which suggests that the dominant impact on well-being from vision loss is caused not by the lack of vision itself but rather by lack of social support or receiving only negative support. Second, human sight even without vision impairment is inherently limited. The typical human eye can only recognize electromagnetic radiation with wavelengths from approximately 390 to 700 nm, and there are unsaturated combinations of multiple wavelengths that we also cannot recognize. Will a resurrected human with ‘normal’ vision have their otherwise perfect union with God lessoned because their retinas fail to respond to light with wavelengths of 367 or 731 nm? If the answer is ‘no’, then we need a reason to think that certain wavelengths are essential to human flourishing in heaven while others are not. Third, imagine an individual with vision impairment who is aware that they are missing out on some human goods despite being in heaven. Would that awareness be sufficient to detract from the beatific vision? It’s not clear to me that it would be. If the fullness of the beatific vision is compatible with awareness of the atrocities of human history and, at least on traditional Christian views about hell, the eternal lack of the beatific vision that those in hell suffer, I think the beatific vision would also be compatible with the absence of certain created goods. To think that perfect union with God will be lessened by the lack of visual access to certain wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation may be to misunderstand the nature of our heavenly goodness. Finite human beings may not be able to co-realize all human goods.

Or consider individuals with cognitive disabilities. The range of human cognitive capacities is broad, even apart from issues related to disability. What range of cognitive abilities are needed for perfect human with God? The higher we set the relevant cognitive bar, the fewer humans will surpass that limit. And as with vision, I think there’s no reason to think that all individuals who have some degree of cognitive disability fall below the relevant limit such that simply in virtue of

4. Conclusion

I’ve argued that there may be some disabilities that can be retained in the afterlife in a way that doesn’t impair the beatific vision. We need not think, like Augustine in the opening epigraph, that having any disability is incompatible with perfect union with God. Not all individuals with disabilities need to be ‘cured’ in order for them to be ‘made whole’. Where do we draw the line between these two types of disability? That’s an admittedly hard question. Above I’ve suggested that we need to approach this question ‘from the ground up’, and so a fully developed account of heavenly disability will need to engage with the complete range disabilities can take.

It bears mentioning that the view I’ve developed here is admittedly speculative and tentative. Nevertheless, it has its merits. I think it not only allows but encourages us to take seriously the testimony of individuals with disabilities, even if that testimony is ultimately defeasible. Furthermore, it can help us avoid some of the negative assumptions that have pervaded much of Church history (e.g., the confinement of disability and sin, tropes of virtuous suffering, segregationist and exclusionary models of ‘charity’), even if the acceptance of heavenly disability isn’t strictly necessary for avoiding those negatives. Given that our eschatology shapes our Christian practices, viewing disability as something that always requires ‘curing’ makes it easier to devalue the lives of those with disabilities. Speaking of eschatological reflection on disability as a kind of ‘frontier theology’, theologian John Hull writes that ‘we discover that disability itself is not a problem. What faith does is to grasp people with disabilities and pull them into the body of Christ, where, as Paul says, the parts that were sometimes looked down on are now given the highest honours.

Many women have refused to abort children diagnosed as having disabilities, thereby giving us stories of ‘defiant births’ that can teach us about radical parental
love. So too perhaps an account of 'defiant afterlives' that seeks to embrace rather than eschew disability can teach us something about the even more radical love of God for his creation.  

References


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